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Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and
Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual
Disadvantages in Employment
MARY E. BECKER*
As a result of many advantages, white men earn significantly more than
women and minorities, especially minority women. Women with college ed-
ucations earn less than men with high school educations.' Comparisons of
wages for full time white male workers and minority women are especially
dramatic. For example, African-American women workers earned $0.62 for
every $1.00 earned by white male workers in 1988.2 Hispanic women earned
even less: $0.56 for every $1.00 earned by white men. 3
These differences are attributable to many factors. Employment discrimi-
nation is only one aspect of the systemic subordination of women and people
of color to whites and men, particularly white men, under rules, practices,
and standards made by white men and preserving their power. In a society
in which neither race nor sex affected future access to economic security and
power there would be both a more equitable distribution of resources and less
subordination.
Given the systemic subordination of other groups to white men, Professor
Strauss has focused our attention on an important question: what are the best
remedies for racial discrimination in employment?4 He suggests several rea-
sons why we should replace individual remedies with a system of quotas and
fines. 5 After using economic models to describe discrimination, he discusses
why such discrimination is conventionally regarded as wrong.6 Professor
Strauss posits that individual disparate treatment is hard to prove and that
disparate treatment remedies work best when the market itself is most likely
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law. Research support was provided by the
Russell Baker Scholars Fund and Russell J. Parsons Faculty Research Fund of the University of
Chicago. I thank Anne-Marie Burley, Lynne Henderson, Cass Sunstein, and Robin West for help-
ful comments on an earlier draft. I thank Paul Bryan, Jennifer Hertz, Charles Ten Brink, William
Schwesig, and Katharene Smith for research assistance.
1. THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-1991 392 (1990) (comparing earnings of workers age 25 and
over for 1987).
2. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 409 (1990) [hereinafter CENSUS REPORT] (for full time year-round workers, me-
dian weekly earnings were $288 for African-American women and $465 for white men).
3. See id. (median weekly earnings for Hispanic women were $260).
4. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619
passim (1991).
5. Id. at Part IV.
6. Id. at Parts I and II.
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to eliminate discrimination. 7 In addition, he asserts that there are too many
weak employment discrimination cases. 8 He therefore suggests that individ-
ual claims of disparate treatment be eliminated except for government en-
forcement and replaced by a system of quotas and goals.9
I agree with much of what Professor Strauss has to say. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196410 is not a very effective way of equalizing the oppor-
tunities of white men and other workers. Title VII is inadequate because it
focuses only on employment, though much of the inequality in the wage-
labor market is attributable to structural advantages white men enjoy outside
the wage labor market. Current Title VII remedies are inadequate for dis-
crimination within employment. And even within Title VII's limited ambit,
too few individuals sue."1
I also agree that a system of quotas would be a good remedy for the disad-
vantages women and minorities face than individual disparate treatment
claims. There are, however, problems with the quota system proposed by
Professor Strauss. Further, why must we choose between quotas and indi-
vidual relief. Structuring the question as such a choice in today's political
climate is extremely dangerous.
Remedies for employment discrimination are appropriate for two reasons.
Remedies should offset or eliminate the structural advantages of white males.
Remedies should also compensate identifiable individuals who have been
damaged by subordination on the basis of race and sex, just as tort law com-
pensates individuals injured in other, analogous contexts. Although quotas
are often more effective than individual remedies at eliminating structural
barriers, individual wrongs should be compensated just as we compensate
other sorts of individual wrongs in the tort system.
I am also troubled by Professor Strauss's method. He accepts abstract
economic models as describing the real world of discrimination and then
tailors legal remedies to cover only that discrimination likely to persist ac-
cording to these models. But the economic models of discrimination have
not been successful at explaining the real world persistence of discrimina-
7. Id. at Part IV.A. 1-2.
8. Id. at 1645.
9. Id. at Part IV.D.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
11. As a formal matter, Title VII does include structural remedies in the form of disparate im-
pact claims, but recent Supreme Court decisions have virtually eliminated this aspect of Title VII by
making it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to win. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642, 657, 659 (1989) (to establish prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, employees
must show any racial disparity in workplace results from specific employment practices; further-
more, plaintiffs retain burden of persuasion in showing such practices not justified by legitimate
business needs); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991, 997 (1988) (disparate
impact analysis applies to subjective employment practices but employee retains burden of proof in
showing no business necessity exists for employer's actions).
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tion.12 Nor do they describe all forms of discrimination. They do not even
purport to describe two common forms of discrimination: many employers'
desire to dominate and their difficulty empathizing with women and people
of color.
Another problem is Professor Strauss's abstract and narrow focus on a
single racial minority-African Americans. He does not consider their his-
tory and, thus, ignores historical reasons why individual remedies might be
justified. He also ignores the fact that most members of racial minorities-
women of color-experience racial discrimination in conjunction with sexual
discrimination. Any employment discrimination remedy should consider the
problems of race and sex discrimination for this most vulnerable group of
employees.' 3 And Professor Strauss does not consider other racial groups at
all, though, for example, Hispanic Americans earn even less than African
Americans. 14
This article is divided into six sections. Section I presents a concrete ex-
ample of discrimination. It is used to make substantive points throughout
the other sections of this article. Section II examines the methodological
problem of relying on economic models to describe the reality of discrimina-
tion. Section III presents a number of problems with considering remedies
for racial discrimination without including the needs of women, particularly
women of color. Section IV discusses the continuing need for individual
remedies. Section V discusses the substantive problems with the Strauss
quota system as well as the danger in today's political climate of suggesting
that we repeal individual remedies and enact a system of quotas and fines.
Section VI suggests alternative reforms. The section begins with a discus-
sion of ways in which Title VII could be improved, many of which were
included in the Civil Rights Act of 1990 5 and are included in the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 16 and ends with a discussion of structural remedies
aimed at improving workplace opportunities by looking beyond the work-
place to social structure.
I. DISCRIMINATION IN THE REAL WORLD
Helen Brooms was a thirty-six year old married black woman when she
12. See Donohue & Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713,
Part 11 (1991) (in the segregated South, for example, discrimination survived market forces in part
because of informal social penalties for not discriminating and universal racist perceptions of blacks'
abilities).
13. Recall that women of color earn significantly less than white women or men. See supra notes
2-3.
14. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 409.
15. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
16. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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was hired by Regal Tube Company as its industrial nurse.1 7 She was super-
vised by John Oberlin, Royal's Assistant Manager, and Charles Gustafson,
Regal's Human Resource Manager. Gustafson made many sexist and racist
statements to Brooms during the sixteen months she worked at Regal.
Brooms ignored or objected to these comments during her first eight or nine
months on the job. She did complain to Oberlin after Gustafson proposi-
tioned her on a business trip she and Gustafson made together. Oberlin ad-
vised her "to tell Gustafson that her husband had given her herpes and to
tape-record her conversations with Gustafson."18
Brooms declined to follow this advice and wrote a letter of protest to Fran-
cis Sazama, Regal's Vice President and General Manager, with a copy to
John Oberlin. Sazama hired an attorney to investigate the allegations. That
attorney interviewed both Gustafson and Brooms and found Brooms to be
"honest and straightforward."1 9 Sazama met with Brooms who said, in re-
sponse to Sazama's inquiry, that she wanted "an apology from the company
and from Gustafson and ... the offensive remarks to end."' 20 Sazama then
met with Gustafson and made him apologize to Brooms, delayed Gustafson's
merit raise, and told him that he would be fired if he repeated the behavior.
Although Gustafson told Brooms as soon as Sazama left that he was not
afraid of Sazama, he did not harass her for several weeks thereafter.2'
A couple of months later, however, the harassment escalated. "[I]n a par-
ticularly offensive incident, Gustafson showed Brooms a pornographic pho-
tograph depicting an interracial act of sodomy and told her that the
photograph showed the 'talent' of a black woman."' 22 Gustafson told
Brooms she had been hired for that purpose. After this event, Brooms filed a
formal charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Regal received notice of the charge
but apparently took no action against Gustafson.
A few months later, Gustafson showed Brooms one of several xerox copies
of a "racist pornographic picture involving bestiality."' 23 He told her that the
picture illustrated "how she 'was going to end up.' "24 As Brooms reached
for one of the copies, "Gustafson grabbed her arm and threatened to kill her
if she moved."' 25 Brooms "threw coffee on him and ran away, screaming and
17. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989).
18. Id. at 416 n.l.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 416-17.
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falling down a flight of stairs as she fled."' 26 She was temporarily disabled
and never returned to Regal. Gustafson and those above him "determined
that he would no longer be effective at Regal" and he resigned.
27
Brooms filed suit under Title VII and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.28 The jury, as the trier of fact in the section 1981 suit, denied her
compensatory and punitive damages, finding that "Brooms did not prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Gustafson 'had engaged in
racial harassment which was so excessive that it altered the condition of
plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working environment.' "29
The judge found for Brooms on her Title VII claims and awarded her back
pay but no other compensatory damages.
30
Against the background of Helen Brooms's experience, I consider the ade-
quacy of both Strauss's method and proposed reform. In the next section, I
focus on his method-reliance on economic models of discrimination. In
subsequent sections, I consider his reform in light of the discrimination
Helen Brooms faced.
II. ECONOMIC MODELS
Economic models of discrimination play a critical role in David Strauss's
argument for eliminating (apart from agency enforcement) 31 individual relief
for disparate treatment in employment. Strauss argues that individual relief
is unnecessary because "[t]he disparate treatment standard is most effective
at duplicating the work that the market is likely to do anyway .... ",32 This is
true if and only if economic models and their underlying assumptions de-
scribe the reality of discrimination adequately and accurately. In this sec-
tion, I discuss five major failings of economic models of discrimination: the
assumptions of rationality and exogenous preferences, the failure to recog-
nize the desire to subordinate and the difficulty empathizing with women and
people of color as forms of discrimination, and the expectation that markets
will eliminate discriminatory desires.
A. RATIONALITY
Adherents of economic models assume that, when discriminating on the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
29. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 417.
30. Id. Compensatory damages are available for claims of racial discrimination under section
1981 but are not available under Title VII, though the latter provides back pay relief for sex as well
as race discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
31. For a discussion of the problems with relying on agency enforcement, see infra Part IV.c.
32. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1644.
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basis of race or sex, people act rationally given their exogenous preferences or
their perceptions of group differences. Some discrimination is, of course, ra-
tional: a rational employer will be less likely to employ members of a racial
minority if they have gone to inferior schools.
Much discrimination is not, however, rational. The word "discrimina-
tion" is poorly chosen, suggesting rationality where it is often absent. Profes-
sor Robin West pointed this out to me in comments on an earlier draft.
"Discrimination" means the ability to make fine distinctions, to see subtle
differences, to use one's reason in an analytically rigorous way. Racism and
misogyny-the belief that people of color and women are less than fully
human-are not "discrimination" in this sense. One does not believe that
African Americans and women are less than fully human because of an ana-
lytically rigorous delineation of subtle differences between them and white
men. To the contrary, racism and misogyny are deeply irrational emotions,
based on hatred or a lack of empathy for "the other," often accompanied by
the need to establish one's own importance by denying others' humanity. It
is not reason and fine ethical distinctions that explain why jurors impose the
death penalty most often on African-American defendants whose victims
were white. 33
Strauss nevertheless uses economic models which assume that discrimina-
tors act rationally given exogenous preferences. Like the economic modelers,
Strauss never defines "rational." Perhaps he means choosing what is in one's
narrow self interest. If this is what is meant by rational discrimination, then
Charles Gustafson did not behave rationally in harassing Helen Brooms. He
lost his job because, even after a warning from a superior, he escalated his
harassment. Perhaps "rational" does not have so narrow a meaning. Per-
haps it means only doing what satisfies one's preferences, even when the re-
sult is self-destruction. At this point, however, "rational" does not have
meaning; it is tautological. What one does is rational because one does it.
B. EXOGENOUS PREFERENCES
Economists who use economic models assume that discriminatory prefer-
ences arise outside of regulatory systems, but discriminatory preferences are
precisely what discrimination law should be regulating. This point can be
made in two ways.34 First, as a historical matter, current preferences are in
part the result of past forms of regulation which are not exogenous to the
33. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286, 292-93 (1987) (study of 2000 murder cases in
Georgia showed jury imposed death penalty in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and
white victims, which was far more often than cases involving either white defendants or black
victims; such statistics insufficient to prove defendant's sentence discriminatory and violative of
equal protection clause).
34. See generally Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).
1664 [Vol. 79:1659
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. L.J. 1664 1990-1991
NEEDED IN THE NINETIES
legal system. Slavery and Jim Crow are closely connected to the refusal of
many whites today to interact with African Americans as equals. Past legal
limitations on women's ability to function as autonomous human beings are
closely connected to the refusal of many men today to interact with women
as equals.
Second, there would be no need for antidiscrimination laws if current pref-
erences to discriminate on the basis of race or gender were not troubling and
capable of change through regulation. The relevant question is how existing
preferences can most effectively be changed.
To assume, as economists do, that preferences are external to, and in-
dependent of, the regulatory system, is to limit inappropriately the range of
possible solutions considered. For example, as discussed in Part VI.B, many
changes outside the employment system might be necessary if employer pref-
erences are to change.
There is an additional problem with economists' assuming exogenous pref-
erences. Ideally, the reformer interested in ending discrimination should
know how discriminatory attitudes are formed and why they persist. In a
world in which we understand little, it may be necessary to try to limit dis-
crimination without such knowledge. But the more the reformer under-
stands about how and why racist and sexist attitudes develop and endure, the
more effective reform is likely to be. Economic models blind the reformer to
this need by assuming what needs to be explored: the existence and persis-
tence of discriminatory "preferences."
We do not, in fact, have a very good understanding about how racism and
sexism take shape and persist. It is, however, clear that socialization-teach-
ing social norms through interpersonal interactions-is powerful in these ar-
eas. 35 A comparison of various societies reveals that, although different
racial, ethnic, or religious groups are disfavored in various societies, among
societies there is "much consistency through time in the pattern of inter-
group relations."' 36 Individuals learn prejudice within a culture like they
learn other aspects of culture.37 Socialization tends to produce individuals
who conform to group norms with respect to intergroup attitudes.
38
Socialization in our society operates through parents, peers, schools, and
35. See Ashmore & Del Boca, Psychological Approaches to Understanding Intergroup Conflicts, in
TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 73-114 (P. Katz ed. 1976) (discussing theories that ra-
cism is learned through sociocultural interaction as well as through intergroup conflict, intergroup
relationships, cognitive and psychological processes).
For a discussion of a psychological theory of gender inequality, see N. CHADOROW, THE REPRO-
DUCTION OF MOTHERING 9-10 (1978) (women's mothering places them in a domestic sphere where
they are dominated by men who occupy a nondomestic, public sphere).
36. Ashmore & Del Boca, supra note 35, at 94.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 97.
16651991]
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the mass media.3 9 There is evidence that each of these cultural channels
shapes intergroup attitudes.40 One cause of racism is that whites are more
visible than African Americans in school text books, the media, etc.41
Whites know less about African Americans than African Americans know
about whites in terms of history and culture. This "lack of knowledge about
blacks and their past makes them 'strange,' and there may be some psycho-
logical rejection of strangeness per se."' 42 Lack of knowledge and contact as
equals produce psychological distance, and "laboratory studies [suggest] that
psychological distance makes it easier for one person to aggress against
another."4 3
Similar points can be made about socialization and inequality between the
sexes. Boys and girls learn an ideology of gender, that a key part of one's
identity depends on gender because girls and boys, women and men, are es-
sentially different and have different interests and abilities. This message is
given continuously through children's books, the media, toys, clothes, and
interactions with others. Even the best intentioned parents cannot eradicate
these differences. Girls, for example, are taught from very young ages that
their appearance is critically important ("you look so pretty in that dress") in
ways boys never experience.
Religion is another socializing influence creating sexist attitudes, at least
for Christians. Women who support nontraditional roles for women are
likely to have had Jewish, atheist, or agnostic parents. 44 In general, religious
Christian women have more traditional attitudes than nonreligious women,45
and traditional roles for women translate into underemployment and low
wages in the wage labor market. For example, one study finds a correlation
between Christians' religiosity and their preference for men as bosses and
39. Id. at 96.
40. See id. at 96-100 (citing studies on how parents, peers, schools, and the media affect and
shape people's prejudices).
41. See id. at 98-99 (textbooks usually ignore black culture and the media tends either to present
a skewed picture of blacks or none at all).
42. Id. at 98.
43. Id.
44. Dempewolff, Some Correlates of Feminism, 34 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 671, 674 (1974).
Religion continues to be passed down from parents to children. See Jennings, Allerbeck, &
Rosenmayr, Generations and Families: General Orientations, in POLITICAL ACTION: MASS PARTIC-
IPATION IN FIVE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 464 (1979) (in study of five industrialized countries,
vast majority of children professed same religious identity as their parents); America: Land of the
Faithful, AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov./Dec. 1990, at 101 (90% of those raised as a Protestant are Protes-
tant today; over 80% of those raised as Catholic or Jewish are, respectively, Catholic or Jewish
today).
45. See Himmelstein, The Social Basis of Antifeminism: Religious Networks and Culture, 25 J.
FOR SCI. STUD. RELIGION 1, 7-12 (1986) (women involved in religious activities are less likely to
support an Equal Rights Amendment and pro-abortion laws than their nonreligious peers).
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professionals. 46 Through religion and other socializing forces, women of all
colors are "stereotyped, culturally dominated, and sexually objectified" and,
as a result, internalize their inferiority and status as sexual objects.47
Socialization as an explanation for racial and sexual inequality only begs
the question: why do racist and sexist social norms develop? I do not address
this complex question, but make only a more limited point. We might do a
better job of eliminating sexism and racism if we understood these social
forces better. Further, it is likely that we need to look at socialization prac-
tices and norms if we want to ensure equality of opportunity in the work-
place. The reformer who accepts economic models as describing the reality
of discrimination will not see the need either to understand how discrimina-
tory attitudes develop or to look beyond the workplace for their correction.
C. SUBORDINATION
A third failing of economic models is that they do not even purport to
describe the discrimination Helen Brooms faced from Charles Gustafson at
Regal Tube. According to the economic models, discrimination takes one of
two forms. Some people discriminate because of an aversion to interacting
with people in certain other groups: "someone has a 'taste for discrimina-
tion,' " if "he" acts "as if he were willing to forfeit income in order to avoid
certain transactions" (i.e., working with African Americans or women).
48
Others discriminate because of real or perceived differences between mem-
bers of various groups with respect to something relevant to productivity,
such as quality of education. 49 Neither of these forms of discrimination in-
cludes the desire of dominants to subordinate those perceived as "other," the
desire Charles Gustafson felt when he encountered Helen Brooms.
The failure to include the desire to subordinate is a major gap in economic
models of discrimination. Some people discriminate, not because of a desire
to work with those like themselves, but because they desire to dominate cer-
tain people from other groups. This can occur in situations other than har-
assment. Some whites might, for example, prefer to employ blacks as
domestic or menial workers because this would be consistent with their no-
tions of the appropriate roles for whites and blacks.50 Part of one's identity
46. Ferber, Huber, & Spitz, Preference for Men as Bosses and Professionals, 58 Soc. FORCES 466,
470 (1979). Catholic women, however, were less traditional than Protestant men and women or
than Catholic men. Id.
47. BARTKY, On Psychological Oppression, in FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 23 (1990).
48. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis omitted).
49. See Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 passim
(1972) (creating a statistical model illustrating employees' use of race or skin color as a proxy for
relevant job information).
50. See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (supervisor expected black, but
16671991]
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can be superiority to members of other groups, and appropriate interactions
can be ego enhancing.
This desire for subordination, rather than aversion, may be a greater part
of discrimination against women than against racial minorities. Sexist men
do not, as a general rule, try to avoid all contact with women. On the con-
trary, they desire contact in certain subordinating forms, such as having wo-
men as secretaries and dependent wives. In contrast, many whites would
prefer to avoid all contact with African Americans, although other whites,
like Gustafson, enjoy subordinating relationships with people of color.
This taste for subordination can be expressed in economic terms. Gustaf-
son's "taste" for sexually humiliating African-American women suggests
that he would be willing to pay these subordinates more than, for example,
white male nurses. Gratification of one's desire to subordinate is a form of
consumption. Gary Becker and other economists who adopt economic mod-
els have not, however, incorporated the desire to subordinate into their
equations. 5 1
John Donohue and James Heckman make a similar point in their contri-
bution to this symposium. They note that even aversion discrimination may
be viewed as a form of consumption if the discriminator "gets positive utility
from hiring workers of a given racial group... [because] this conduct serves
to brand the nonpreferred races as inferior."' 52 When discrimination in the
form of satisfying a desire to subordinate is consumption, there is no reason
to expect the market to drive out discrimination regardless of whether it is
employers, other employees, or customers who want to subordinate. 53 As
consumption, subordination can endure despite costs associated with it pro-
vided that the utility derived from consumption is greater than the cost. 54
An economist might respond that a remedy is nonetheless inappropriate
because, if Gustafson cannot harass women, or perhaps black women, he
may not hire them at all.5 5 This is the standard economic argument against
not white, workers in bonding and coating department of manufacturing plant to help clean be-
cause, according to supervisor, "Colored people are hired to clean because they clean better.")
51. See G. BECKER, supra note 48, at 16-18 (discussing only tastes for discrimination and market
discrimination); Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 6
(1973) (discussing discrimination only in terms of an aversion to minority groups).
52. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 12, at 1723.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. An economist might also argue that the Royal Tube job simply was an additional opportu-
nity for Helen Bloom. Eliminating it would not be in her favor. She would only have one less job
opportunity, and some African-American female job applicants might be willing to endure Gustaf-
son's harassment in order to receive the premium he is willing to pay. This assumes that such a job
applicant has perfect information, that there are alternative employment opportunities (at a slightly
discounted wage) open to the applicant, and that she knows that there will be less harassment at
those jobs than at this one. Alternatively, it assumes that she could easily switch jobs after she has
1668 [Vol. 79:1659
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antidiscrimination remedies: Title VII will not expand opportunities for mi-
norities and women; it will only restrict them. If employers cannot, for ex-
ample, pay women less because they value them less, they will not hire them
at all. Has Title VII, in fact, worked to increase or decrease opportunities for
minorities and women?
Empirical work suggests that Title VII has had some marginal positive
effect and has not simply closed opportunities for women and minorities.
56
More importantly, antidiscrimination legislation seems to have changed cul-
tural norms. Although it is impossible to gauge Title VII's effect in changing
cultural norms, racial and sexual discrimination are considered by many to
be less appropriate today than in 1964 when Title VII was passed. Similarly,
sexual harassment is seen as less legitimate than it was before sexual harass-
ment was regarded as illegal under Title VII. These normative changes may
be the most important result of Title VII.
A number of my criticisms in this subsection have dealt with the inability
of the Strauss proposal to deal with harassment. In the final version of his
been at Royal long enough to realize what faces her. But applicants often have far-from perfect
information about a workplace, few viable alternatives, and there are high costs to switching jobs.
56. See, e.g., Beller, The Effects of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Women's Entry into
Nontraditional Occupations: An Economic Analysis, I L. & INEQUALITY 73, 75 (1983) (concluding
that "Title VII has proved somewhat effective in narrowing the earnings gap between men and
women"); Donohue & Heckman, supra note 12, at Part I (reviewing evidence which suggests Title
VII has contributed to African Americans' economic gains); Heckman & Payner, Determining the
Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks. A Study of South
Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 143-44 (1989) (Title VII had positive effects for African Ameri-
cans in textile plants in South Carolina when EEOC targeted southern textile manufacturers for
enforcement efforts; Title VII may have given employer basis for doing what they wanted in tight
labor market despite "tastes" of white employees); Pettigrew & Martin,'Shaping the Organizational
Context for Black American Inclusion, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 41, 45-46 (1987) (noting that "governmen-
tal actions against racial discrimination" have resulted in employment gains by blacks; for example,
in large part because of a settlement between the FCC and Bell Telephone Company, "[b]etween
1960 and 1980 the black proportion of the nation's telephone operators rose from 2.5 to 14.5%").
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), which mandates affirmative action for those
contracting with the federal government, has been more effective. See, e.g., EMPLOYMENT STAN-
DARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORITIES AND
WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NONCONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS, 1974-1980: A RE-
PORT OF THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 63-64 (1984) (minorities
and women employed in greater numbers and in a greater variety of jobs in workplaces operating
under OFCC requirements than in workplaces operating only under Title VII requirements); J.
LEONARD, THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 38 (1983) (review of 68,000 establishments con-
cludes that blacks' share of employment increased in OFCC workplaces). See also Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 207 (1985) (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers) ("affirmative action
has been and is an effective way of ensuring equal opportunity for all people in the workplace"); H.
HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPORTUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1970'S 5 (1984)
(Potomac Institute study finds affirmative action an important factor in increasing the number of
working minorities and women and in improving the kinds of positions they held).
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proposal, Strauss includes a footnote stating: "I should make clear that I do
not view my analysis as applying to issues of harassment, and I do not sug-
gest that the scheme I propose is an effective way of dealing with harass-
ment. ' '57 He does not, however, explain what individual remedies would
survive under his proposal nor how harassment differs from other forms of
disparate treatment. Indeed, even in this footnote he does not explicitly state
that individuals would be able to bring individual harassment claims if his
proposal were adopted. And the proposal itself still states "private individu-
als should not be able to bring suits for discriminatory treatment under the
employment discrimination laws."'58
Harassment is not a unique form of discrimination. 59 The points I make
about the proposal in light of what happened to Helen Brooms at Regal Tube
could be made about other forms of disparate treatment. For example, an
employer might adopt an explicit rule requiring black women (or all women)
to wear make-up and mini skirts because of a desire of the decisionmaker,
male employees, or customers for sexualized and subordinating relationships
with women or certain women. Such a requirement would not be harass-
ment (as that word is conventionally understood) but could be equivalent to
harassment in terms of the underlying motivations and effects: sexualization
of women employees. Similarly, an employer could require black women (or
all women) to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have [their] hair styled, and wear jewelry."' 6 Again,
this would not be conventionally regarded as harassment but could be
equivalent in terms of sexualizing and subordinating women employees.
Would women be able to contest these employment practices under the
Strauss proposal? If they could, why not all forms of disparate treatment?
Precisely what forms of individual disparate treatment would survive?
D. DIFFICULTY WITH EMPATHY
Another form of discrimination not addressed by the economic models is a
lessened ability to empathize and identify with women and people of color
and to put oneself in their shoes, incorporating their hurts and needs into
57. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1624 n.17.
58. Id. at 1655.
59. Strauss concludes footnote 17 by stating: "I discuss (from a different angle) the relationship
between harassment and discrimination in Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown," 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 935, 1004-06 (1989). Strauss, supra note 4, at 1624 n.17. The brief
discussion of harassment in this earlier article argues that harassment is a form of disparate treat-
ment even if the employer's policy can be expressed in neutral terms (employer ignores all harass-
ment). This is entirely consistent with my point: harassment is one form of disparate treatment and
not unique in any relevant way.
60. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (holding such conduct
discriminatory).
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one's perceptions. 6' We all empathize best with those most like ourselves,
62
but we live in a society in which white men disproportionately hold positions
of power. Their difficulties empathizing with women and people of color are,
therefore, especially troubling. In addition, even women and people of color
may fail to give appropriate weight to the sufferings and needs of those like
themselves because they have internalized their inferiority.
63
Sexual or racial harassment is one rather extreme form of this failing.
Charles Gustafson, for example, did not take into account Helen Brooms's
suffering as human pain; he found it titillating rather than troubling. He
could not empathize with her. Had she been another white male, he might
have been able to empathize with "her" suffering.
Decisionmakers discriminate by failing to empathize in countless situa-
tions other than sexual or racial harassment. For example, a decisionmaker
considering how severely to discipline an employee who has behaved inap-
propriately may react differently depending on the offender's race and sex
because of a lessened ability to empathize with the problems of women and
people of color. Similarly, a decisionmaker evaluating a subordinate's per-
formance will be affected by whether she can empathize with the difficulties
the subordinate has faced either at work or at home. Empathy or the lack of
it pervades all interpersonal relationships, including the workplace.
Again, the economic models fail to describe this form of discrimination. It
is based neither on an aversion to contact with members of certain groups
nor on a perception that groups differ with respect to productivity, the two
forms of discrimination encompassed by the economic models. If lessened
ability to empathize with women and people of color is widespread, the mar-
ket will not drive out this unconscious emotional failing. It certainly has not
eliminated it yet.64
61. For discussions of the problem of lessened empathy for women and people of color, see, e.g.,
D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 162-77 (1987) (describing how society is so much more at-
tuned and responsive to whites' problems than blacks'); Henderson, Legality and Empathy. 85
MicH. L. REV. 1574, 1620-38 (1987) (discussing how some Supreme Court justices' lack of empa-
thy for women affected abortion cases); West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives. A Phenom-
enological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 81-83 (1987) (the legal
culture has ignored how women's pain and pleasure differ from men's).
62. Henderson, supra note 61, at 1584.
63. See BARTKEY, supra note 47, at 22-23 (constant psychological oppression by the dominant
group can result in the dominated group internalizing feelings of inferiority and low self-esteem).
64. See S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 4-5 (1987) (suggesting that juries have difficulty empathizing
with rape survivors). The high rate at which juries impose the death penalty on black defendants
whose victims are white suggests jurors have more difficulty empathizing with such defendants than
others. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (death penalty imposed in 22% of mur-
der cases where defendant black and victim white). Although these sources do not deal with em-
ployment, the decisionmakers involved are, of course, also present in the workplace.
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E. MARKETS SATISFY DESIRES
Economic models of discrimination predict that the market will eliminate,
on inefficiency grounds, discriminatory "preferences" not based on accurate
perceptions of group differences. 65 But the market will often reinforce,
rather than eliminate, such discrimination because markets facilitate satisfac-
tion of the desires of those with an ability to pay.
The racial and sexual segregation of labor and subordination of people of
color and women did not begin with capitalism. Capitalism developed in
societies in which people of color and women were regarded as less human
than white men, were "naturally" subordinate to white men, and generally
performed different tasks than white men. Any economic system that devel-
ops in a society in which power and opportunities are differentially allocated
on the basis of race and sex is likely to operate in a manner that will perpetu-
ate those differentials, regardless of the particulars of economic organization
or theory. Thus, opportunities and wages may be allocated on the basis of
productivity and potential in a capitalist economy, but productivity and po-
tential are assessed by those with the ability to pay. The desires, values, bi-
ases, and blind spots of the dominant determine the allocation of wages and
opportunities and the meaning of "productivity" and "potential" in a capital-
ist economy. 66
Consider two specific examples of the market's inability always to elimi-
nate discriminatory desire: Charles Gustafson's desire for subordinating sex-
uality and the cross-cultural sexual division of labor. The market did not in
fact drive out Charles Gustafson's desire to dominate Helen Brooms. And it
is far from certain that Charles Gustafson will control his behavior in the
future, even though he did lose his job at Regal Tube. Sexuality can be self-
destructive as well as destructive of the humanity of others. Gustafson may
lose job after job harassing African-American women, but may nevertheless
persist.
Even if Gustafson does learn to behave differently, he did harass Helen
Brooms. He will not be the last to harass a woman. In a culture in which
pornography is widely consumed and the subordination of women of all col-
ors is sexualized, 67 individuals with Charles Gustafson's desires will come of
age, get jobs, and abuse positions of power for at least temporary periods. In
an increasingly pornographic culture, the market will not drive out such de-
65. See Strauss, supra note 4, at Part III.A.
66. This paragraph is taken from a discussion in an earlier publication. Becker, Barriers Facing
Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel &
Lazear, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 934, 935-36 (1986).
67. See generally Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 591-602
(discussing how pornography subordinates women and desensitizes men).
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sire. The market will stimulate it-through advertising, for example-be-
cause satisfaction of desires is a good for which people will pay.
The cross-cultural sexual segregation of labor is a second illustration of the
market's limitations. Regardless of the details of economic organization, in
all cultures there is a division of labor by sex. 68 Although there is a great
deal of variation from society to society in what work is men's and what
women's, whatever men do is more important than whatever women do.
69
More than twenty-five years after the effective date of Title VII, the sexual
division of labor in the United States remains extremely high if one looks at
site specific data-the extent to which women and men in a single workplace
hold segregated jobs.70 Consistent with the cross-cultural data, the jobs wo-
men hold are valued less than the jobs men hold. In 1988, for full-time work-
ers, women earned about $.70 for every $1.00 earned by men.71 This is
remarkably close to the differential specified in the book of Leviticus: fifty
shekels for a man and thirty for a woman.
72
Differences in women's and men's education, training, and labor market
commitment explain, at most, about half of this wage gap.
7 3 These differ-
ences may themselves, of course, reflect different treatment of women and
men (e.g., with respect to on-the-job training) and the different opportunities
they face. Women, for example, may well underinvest in human capital rela-
tive to men because they receive less than men in return for their human
68. Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in TOWARD AN
ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 178 (R. Reiter ed. 1975). Gayle Rubin has called this phenomenon
"a taboo against the sameness of men and women, a taboo dividing the sexes into two mutually
exclusive categories, a taboo which exacerbates the biological differences between the sexes and
thereby creates gender."
69. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture, in WOMAN, CULTURE, & SOCIETY 67
(1974) ("secondary status of woman in society is one of the true universals"); Reskin, Bringing the
Men Back In: Sex Differentiation and the Devaluation of Women's Work, 2 GENDER AND Soc. 58,
63 (1988) ("men's activities are typically valued above women's"); Rubin, supra note 68, at 178.
70. In measuring either the degree to which the sexes are equal or the amount of sex segregation
remaining, one should look at site specific data, rather than aggregate data, because individual
women and men are not integrated into the same jobs unless they are working at the same job at the
same place. If, for example, women and men are managers in equal numbers in different industries
or firms at different wage levels (with higher pay and status for men), sex segregation has not ended,
and women and men are not equal.
One of the few site specific studies is Bielby & Baron, A Woman's Place is with Other Women, in
SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 27 (B. Reskin ed.
1984) [hereinafter SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE]. This study looked at data from 1959-
1979 and found that "segregation levels were virtually constant [in most organizations studied]
during the late 1960s and early 1970s." Id. at 50-51.
71. See CENSUS REPORT supra note 2, at 409 (median weekly earnings were $449 for men and
$315 for women).
72. Leviticus 27:1-4.
73. Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, Work Experience, Job Segregation, and Wages, in SEX SEGRE-
GATION IN THE WORKPLACE 184-185 (1984); Rhode, Gender Equality and Employment Policy, in
THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-1991 179 (1990).
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capital investments. In any event, the other half of the wage gap is associated
with the fact that women and men do different work (or the same work in
different work places), and the work men do is valued more highly than the
work women do at any given site.
Given the cross-cultural persistence of a sexual division of labor and the
devaluation of women's work, it is unrealistic to expect the market to elimi-
nate sex discrimination. The market does not set values in a vacuum, but in
the context of social values. If sexual sameness in labor is taboo and women
are devalued, the market will reflect these inequities rather than eliminate
them.
In sum, reformers should not accept economic models of discrimination as
describing the real world of discrimination for several reasons. First, econo-
mists using these models assume people discriminate "rationally" given their
exogenous preferences, though much discrimination is not "rational" in any
meaningful sense. Second, such economists assume "preferences" are exoge-
nous whereas discriminatory desires are socially constructed. Rather than
ignoring how such preferences arise, we need to focus on how to change their
construction. Third and fourth, these economists ignore the desire to
subordinate and the difficulty of empathizing with women and people of
color as forms of discrimination. Fifth, markets facilitate satisfying desires
rather than eliminating them.
I now turn from examining Strauss's reliance on economic models to other
aspects of his proposal. In the next section, I criticize the narrow way in
which he focuses on race. In subsequent sections, I consider other problems
with the quota-fine plan and propose alternative reforms.
III. RACE WITHOUT HISPANICS, HISTORY, OR SEX
In this section I offer three criticisms of Professor Strauss's narrowly fo-
cused discussion. First, Strauss mentions only one racial minority-African
Americans. A thorough discussion of race discrimination must include other
racial minorities. Second, Strauss fails to consider the effect of history; any
thorough discussion of the reasons for remedying discrimination must in-
clude more history. Third, Strauss analyzes only race, and not sex, discrimi-
nation; considering race discrimination without discussing sex is likely to
lead to reforms that do too little for the most vulnerable groups in the labor
market.
First, Strauss discusses racial discrimination but mentions only one racial
minority: African Americans. There are many racial minorities in the
United States. As gauged by wages, African-American workers are not the
most vulnerable group in the American labor force; Hispanic workers earn
less. Hispanic men earn $0.66 for every $1.00 earned by white men; African-
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American men earn $0.72 for every $1.00 earned by white men.74 Hispanic
women earn $0.56 for every $1.00 earned by white men while African-Amer-
ican women earn $0.62 for every $1.00 earned by white men.75 Strauss's
failure to talk about discrimination against other minorities, especially this
particularly vulnerable group, may lead to problems identifying necessary
remedies or reforms. For example, Hispanic workers will not have equal
opportunities in the job market as long as many are working as illegal aliens,
making them particularly vulnerable to exploitation.
My second and related point is that Strauss includes little in the way of
history beyond the occasional reference to "past" wrongs. 76 He does not
ever refer to slavery or to the fact that, at the end of slavery, "freed" people
were not given their share of the wealth they had amassed; whites kept it all.
Nor does he refer to the fact that whites stole the land and destroyed the
culture of Native Americans, though that might obviously be relevant to rea-
sons for remedying discrimination against Hispanics, many of whom are the
descendants of Native Americans.
Third, Strauss discusses what remedies are appropriate for race discrimi-
nation without considering how sex discrimination should be remedied.
Judged by yearly wages, the most vulnerable groups in employment are His-
panic and African-American women. 77 Yet the needs of Hispanic and Afri-
can-American women cannot be addressed by remedies geared solely to race
discrimination without any consideration of sex. Race and sex are not mutu-
ally exclusive categories. Kimberle Crenshaw has described what happens
when they are treated as though they were: "Black women are theoretically
erased."178 A similar point could be made about Hispanic women and other
women of color.
Discrimination against women of color often operates differently, is fueled
by different factors, and results in different stereotypes, than discrimination
74. See CENSUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 409 (in 1988, median weekly earnings were $347 for
African-American men, $307 for Hispanic men, and $465 for white men).
75. See supra note 2.
76. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 1629 (in a brief discussion, Strauss refers only to "past wrongs"
without citing any specifics).
77. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
78. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. OF CHI. L.F. 139, 139.
See also P. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 221-237 (1990) (discussing importance of not
viewing race, gender, age, class, etc. as separate systems of oppression); Scales-Trent, Black Women
and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 10
(1989) ("By creating two separate categories for its major social problems-'the race problem,' and
'the women's issue'-society has ignored the group which stands at the interstices of these two
groups, black women in America."); Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title
VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21 (1991) (discussing many problems black women have under Title
VII because of judges' failure to appreciate the ways in which sex discrimination and race discrimi-
nation interact).
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against either men of color or white women. Consider, for example, African
Americans. Sexuality has played an important part in racist attitudes to-
wards black men, who tend, more than white men, to be regarded primarily
in terms of their (very threatening) sexuality. 79 In different ways, sex has
been historically used to subordinate black women; consider the frequent
rape of female slaves by their owners and overseers. Even after abolition,
black women could be raped with impunity, especially by white men. 80 To
this day, black women are seen as "easier" and as more exotic sexual part-
ners than white women. 8' These and other factors (there has been little re-
search on how discrimination operates against black women 82) are likely to
affect the treatment of African-American women in the job market.
Similar points could be made about Hispanic women, Asian women, and
other women of color. Discrimination operates differently for each of these
groups with respect both to men of their group and women of other groups.
Asian women are, for example, seen as particularly passive.
Three points follow from an appreciation of how sex discrimination inter-
sects with race discrimination. First, the reformer should consider how dis-
crimination against these marginal groups operates in deciding what reforms
are needed. Second, the reformer should appreciate that one cannot deal
separately with racial and sexual discrimination.
Both these points are illustrated by Brooms v. Royal Tube. A reformer
who considered racial-sexual harassment would not be likely to eliminate
individual remedies in favor of racial quotas. Such "reform" leaves Helen
Brooms inadequately protected with respect to race discrimination. Helen
Brooms experienced discrimination as an African-American woman, not as
either a woman or a member of a racial minority. Helen Brooms was racially
and sexually harassed. Recall, for example, that Gustafson told her that a
pornographic picture showed the "talent" of a black woman. 83 If racial and
sexual remedies are distinct, Helen Brooms will have difficulty presenting her
claim for racist-sexist harassment. If Helen Brooms is to be able to seek a
remedy for the kind of discrimination she actually experienced (rather than
the kind a black man or a white woman would have), then she must be able
to show that Gustafson made racist-sexist comments.
If Helen Brooms is limited to making claims of either racial or sexual dis-
crimination, then she must express her wrong in terms of the wrongs suffered
79. See BARTKY, supra note 47, at 23 ("Black men and women of all races have been victims of
sexual stereotyping-and] are thought to lack the capacities for instinctual control").
80. Crenshaw, supra note 78, at 157-59.
81. Id. at 159.
82. Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 56, at 52 n.5.
83. Brooms v. Royal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989).
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by the more privileged. 84 There will be some risk that she will lose both
claims. The trier of fact may conclude that she was not discriminated against
on the basis of race (as the jury did) and also that she was not discriminated
against on the basis of sex (as the judge, fortunately, did not).
Because her harassment was seen as only sexist, Helen Brooms was unable
to get full relief; the remedies available to her distinguished between race and
sex. Section 1981 relief, with compensatory damages, was available only for
claims of racial, and not sexual, harassment.8 5 Title VII is available for
claims of racial and sexual discrimination, including harassment, 86 but
awards monetary damages only in the form of back pay;87 general compensa-
tory damages are not available under Title VII. Because the jury found no
racial discrimination, Helen Brooms was limited to back pay under Title VII
in her claim for sex discrimination.
Brooms should not have had to plead and prove her racial harassment and
sexual harassment claims separately because the harassment was both sexist
and racist. The inability to combine these forms of discrimination under sec-
tion 1981 resulted in an inadequate remedy. Reformers should not consider
the appropriate remedies for race discrimination separately from the reme-
dies for sexual discrimination.
There is a third problem with Strauss's failure to consider the needs of
women of color. If Strauss's quota applies only to race and does not, for
example, apply separately to African-American women as a group distinct
from African-American men, then employers, including blue collar employ-
ers who are likely to prefer men for a variety of reasons, 88 can fill their quota
by hiring only African-American men. African-American women would
have no apparent remedy under the Strauss proposal, despite the likelihood
that such an employer will discriminate more against them than against Afri-
can-American men. As a result, African-American women may have less
chance of being hired for traditionally male, higher-paying jobs under the
Strauss quota system than today. Yet Strauss never considers the effect of
his proposal on this vulnerable group of workers.
84. Crenshaw, supra note 78, at 140 ("in race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be
viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race-
and class-privileged women").
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (language does not encompass sexual discrimination).
Today, racial harassment claims can no longer be brought under § 1981. See Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989) (§ 1981 only applies to "discrimination only in the
making and enforcement of contracts" and not to racial harassment).
86. See id. at 180 (racial and sexual harassment actionable under Title VII).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1988).
88. See Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219,
1237-1241 (1986) (women have been excluded from blue collar jobs because of their vulnerability to
hazardous environments, the costs of protective equipment and added washrooms, and the difficul-
ties with on-the-job training).
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In this section, I have criticized Strauss's narrow focus on race discrimina-
tion because he ignores racial minorities other than African Americans, ig-
nores history, and ignores the fact that racial minorities have a sex. I have
argued that the reformer must consider the experience and needs of the many
racial minorities in the United States, the history of these groups, and the
fact that most are women. In the absence of such analysis, we are unlikely to
formulate reforms that will meet the needs of the most numerous and vulner-
able people of color: women. I have argued for "placing those who currently
are marginalized in the center" of reform efforts. 89 In the next section I
consider Strauss's proposal to eliminate individual remedies for employment
discrimination on the basis of race.
IV. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL REMEDIES
Professor Strauss proposes that individual remedies under Title VII be
eliminated.90 Agency enforcement would still be available, but unless the
agency pursued a claim, an individual claimant would be limited to "state
wrongful discharge actions and . . .employment grievance proceedings." 9 1
In this section, I offer two related criticisms of this aspect of the Strauss
proposal. First, I argue there is a continuing need to redress individual
claims of discrimination, addressing in detail a number of Strauss's points
about why such claims are no longer necessary. Second, I argue that the
question is not whether such claims should be entirely eliminated, but
whether a federal forum should be available for discrimination claims.
A. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
In building a case against redress of individual disparate treatment claims,
Strauss offers a number of unsubstantiated assertions. I begin with his more
general assertions and then move to specific ones.
1. The market will tend to eliminate nonstatistical discrimination.92  The
most basic problem with Strauss's conclusion that the market will tend to
eliminate nonstatistical discrimination (especially employer or employee ani-
mus) has been discussed in an earlier section of this article: his reliance on
inadequate economic models. Economic models do not describe reality, and
thus cannot justify eliminating individual remedies. Individual remedies
continue to be needed. The market had not, for example, driven out racial-
sexual harassment by 1983 and 1984, the years Charles Gustafson harassed
Helen Brooms. She needed an individual remedy.
89. Crenshaw, supra note 78, at 167.
90. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1655.
91. Id.
92. Id. at Part III.A.
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2. "The employment discrimination laws should be designed to give employ-
ers incentives to hire and promote members of minority groups in proportion to
their representation in the relevant population. 93 Professor Strauss offers
no compelling reason for this assertion. In other areas-tort and contract,
for example-the law is concerned with compensating injuries as well as cre-
ating appropriate incentives. Why should Helen Brooms's injury be less
compensable than the injuries traditionally recognized as tort or breach of
contract? What sort of message would a legal system give were it to compen-
sate individual injuries in tort and contract but not in employment
discrimination?
Antidiscrimination law, like law in other areas, should be concerned both
with compensating past injuries and creating incentives so that injuries will
be less likely in the future. Title VII provides too little, not too much, com-
pensation for past injuries. Title VII did not fully compensate Helen
Brooms, though Gustafson's conduct harmed Helen Brooms just as surely as
if he had committed a clearly recognized tort. She should be fully compen-
sated by receiving, not only backpay, but also compensation for the pain and
suffering associated with her psychological and physical injuries.
3. There are too many Title VII cases brought today.94 In arguing that our
society has moved beyond individual disparate treatment claims, Strauss
maintains that there are too many Title VII cases. The evidence suggests,
however, that there may be too few. People are much less likely to see a
lawyer or litigate an employment discrimination claim than any other legal
claim.95 Although people may be more likely to consult a lawyer today
about job discrimination than they were in the past,96 data from 1974 are
spectacularly low: only about 1% of those who thought they had been dis-
criminated against in employment consulted a lawyer. 97 In the period from
1978 to 1985, over twice as many personal injury tort cases were brought in
federal courts as job discrimination cases. 98 This -is a particularly striking
statistic because most personal injury cases were probably brought in state
93. Id. at 1620.
94. Id. at 1648.
95. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 135 (1977) (study based on interviews
conducted in 1974 concluded that people are much less likely to consult a lawyer about perceived
job discrimination than any other legal problem).
96. See Samborn, Many Americans Find Bias at Work, THE NAT'L LAW JOURNAL, July 16,
1990, at 1 (62% of people surveyed reported that they would be more likely to sue for employment
discrimination than they would have been five years ago).
97. B. CURRAN, supra note 95, at 136. The next lowest category involved disputes against a
municipality; only about 6% of people with such disputes consulted a lawyer. Id. at 135.
98. See Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical
Tests. 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 357 (1990) (15,865 personal injury tort claims brought, compared to
7,165 job discrimination claims).
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courts during this period. Without data about the relative incidence of tradi-
tional tortious injuries and employment discrimination, together with infor-
mation about the number of torts litigated in any court and norms about the
appropriate level of litigation in these areas, one cannot conclude that there
have been too many Title VII suits. There may have been too few.
There are a number of weaknesses in Title VII which make it extremely
likely that there are too few suits. Title VII has unusually short filing re-
quirements99 and no compensatory damages other than backpay. 1°° Title
VII trials are painful for plaintiffs both personally and professionally. Many
discriminatees do not know that there has been discrimination. Dis-
criminatees still working for the discriminator are reluctant to sue. Even
people who have been fired are unlikely to sue because suing is likely to have
a negative effect on employability for the rest of their lives; the plaintiff may
be considered a whiner, someone who can't take a joke and go with the flow.
For countless reasons, including the internalization of inferiority, victims are
unlikely to sue.101
Another reason there are too few Title VII cases is because it is too diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to win on the merits. A number of substantive rules ham-
per plaintiffs. The roll call of recent Supreme Court cases limiting the
availability of employment discrimination remedies is well known, 10 2 but
other substantive rules also pose problems. Consider, for example, the ten-
dency of judges to consider women's job preferences as stable and exogenous
to women's perceptions about employment opportunities. 0 3 This tendency
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988) (charges must be filed with the EEOC within either 180 days
or 300 days of the discriminatory act, the longer period being applicable in states with EEOC-like
state agencies).
100. Id. § 2003-5(g) (compensatory damages limited to back pay).
101. K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIcTIMs 78-
84, 98-108 (1988) (discussing the problems victims have, including feeling intimidated and power-
less, in using the legal system to redress discrimination).
102. See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 909-10 (1989) (time period in
which challenges to discriminatory seniority systems must be brought begins to run from the date
the seniority system adopted, not from when effects of seniority system felt); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (plaintiff has burden of persuasion in showing not only that
an employment practice had a disparate impact, but also that it did not serve a legitimate business
purpose); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989) (once employee shows a decision
was influenced by impermissible discrimination, the defendant has opportunity to show that, but for
the discrimination, the same decision would have been made); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997-98 (1988) (in challenge to promotion criteria, employer has burden of
producing evidence that its practices serve a business necessity; employee retains burden of proving
equally effective, nondiscriminatory criteria exist).
Although Price Waterhouse at least shifts the burden from the plaintiffs, it would be better to
hold that the defendant loses once the plaintiff shows that the decision was tainted.
103. See Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work- Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segre-
gation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1749, 1756 (1990).
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has made it very difficult to use Title VII to challenge sex segregation in the
workplace, even though segregation is a major component of workplace dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.'°4
Because many discrimination claims can only be tried by judges, 105 judicial
hostility may be another reason too few cases are brought. My impression
from reading a nonrandom selection of cases is that it is much easier for
federal judges to empathize with and find for plaintiffs in age discrimination
cases. 1 6 This is not surprising since age discrimination plaintiffs are often
elderly professional white men like the judges themselves, people judges can
easily imagine are qualified. Juries do better than judges at empathizing with
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. One study reports that when
employment discrimination cases in federal court were tried by a judge,
plaintiffs won 19.2% of the time.10 7 In contrast, when the cases were tried
by a jury, plaintiffs won 42.6% of the time. 108 This is true even in the south,
where plaintiffs won cases tried by judges only 18.6% of the time but won
cases tried by juries 38.4% of the time. 109 Success rates before juries are not
out of line with success rates for other kinds of claims in federal courts. For
example, plaintiffs win personal injury cases involving assault, libel, and slan-
der 42% of the time in federal court."10
4. Title VII cases are weak; plaintiffs are marginal employees. 1 Strauss
minimizes the need for on-the-job disparate treatment protection by asserting
that "[e]ven a discriminating employer will be less likely to discharge a supe-
104. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd 839
F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1988) (EEOC presented statistical evidence showing employer had significantly
underhired women for higher paying jobs, but trial judge found any workplace segregation was due
to women's lack of interest in the higher paid, more competitive jobs).
For an excellent critique of cases suggesting women's job preferences are shaped outside of the
workforce and suggestions for better substantive rules, see Schultz, supra note 103.
105. Juries are only available in § 1981 suits, which can be brought only when the plaintiff al-
leges race discrimination in hiring or in promotion to a new position (which is considered equivalent
to a new contract of employment). See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176
(1989) (by its plain terms, § 1981 applies only to the "making and enforcement" of contracts).
106. Compare the following cases in which the Seventh Circuit took strikingly different ap-
proaches to sex discrimination and age discrimination plaintiffs. Compare International Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 892 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (in challenge
to employer excluding all fertile women from certain hazardous jobs, plaintiffs bear burden of show-
ing no less restrictive, equally effective alternative policies exist) with Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828
F.2d 1202, 1209-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (where employer fired manager of unprofitable plant because he
made more money than other employees, court found age discrimination because employer did not
meet burden of showing that less restrictive alternative-such as reducing salary-as not available).
107. Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcome in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1567, 1591 (1989).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 357.
111. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1645.
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rior minority employee." ' 1 2 In deciding what remedies are needed, the re-
former cannot assume that everyone will act in their rational self-interest and
that the market will therefore eliminate discrimination. Discrimination is
based, in part, on factors too deeply embedded in the human psyche to be so
easily eradicated. Consider, for example, Gustafson's treatment of Brooms.
Or consider a male supervisor deciding, because the economy is in a
slump," 3 whether to fire a man (whom he regards as a breadwinner) or a
woman (whom he regards as earning a disposable second income). Choosing
the man over the woman might not be entirely rational if she is the superior
worker, but it nevertheless occurs. Recall the experience of women workers
in factories when World War II ended and the "boys" came home. Most
were fired regardless of ability. Moreover, it is "rational" in some sense for
male decisionmakers to maintain male privilege, regardless of the interests of
the owners of a company.
Strauss asserts that "there is some tendency for plaintiffs in discrimination
litigation to be borderline employees."' '14 He does not, however, cite any
authority for this assertion. " 5 In part, it is based on Strauss's belief that even
"a discriminating employer will be less likely to discharge a superior minor-
ity employee." ' " 6 But it does happen. That it is unlikely does not mean it
may not happen millions of times a year in a country as large as the United
States. Many unlikely events lead to legal liability for harm caused when
they do occur. Strauss does refer to anecdotal evidence that a Title VII dis-
parate treatment trial tends to be a two- or three-day investigation of "the
qualifications of a borderline employee."' ' 7 But this ignores the settlement
effect. One would expect strong cases to settle. They may even settle prior to
a complaint being filed. If strong cases settle, one would expect the litigated
cases to be weak. That the litigated cases may be weak does not mean that
all cases are weak or that the cause of action is unnecessary. Moreover, the
fact that plaintiffs before juries win employment discrimination cases under
section 1983 as often as assault, libel, and slander cases" 18 suggests that liti-
gated Title VII claims are no weaker than other claims, though the require-
ment that Title VII claims be tried before more hostile judges is a problem
and likely to result in too few Title VII cases being brought.
112. Id.
113. Discriminatory firing claims rise when the economy is weak. Donohue & Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 999-1000 (1991).
114. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1645.
115. Later in that same paragraph, Strauss cites to Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 113. This
paper, however, only establishes that Title VII cases usually involve firing rather than failure to
hire. Donohue and Siegelman say nothing about the strength or weakness of Title VII firing cases.
116. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1645.
117. Id. at 1646.
118. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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Further, if individual claims for outrageous discrimination are eliminated,
overt discrimination will become more common. The fact that overt discrim-
ination has declined since Title VII was enacted hardly guarantees that it will
not reappear were Title VII to disappear. Racism and sexism pervade our
culture. Racist hate speech is emerging more strongly on college cam-
puses. 119 Pornography and sexist jokes pervade many workplaces even with
Title VII on the books.
120
5. Statistical discrimination is most likely to occur at hiring. 121 Strauss min-
imizes the need for on-the-job disparate treatment protection with the state-
ment that statistical discrimination "is most likely to occur in hiring."' 122 He
cites no authority for this proposition. Discrimination at entry is certainly a
major problem. But statistical discrimination may occur whenever the deci-
sionmakers who statistically discriminate interact with a member of the sus-
pect group. If the "suspect" (i.e., the person suspected of having
characteristics perceived as typical of her or his group) is in a token situation
with few members of her or his group present, majority workers are likely to
assume the "suspect" is incompetent. 123 Supervisors often have unreasona-
bly low or high expectations about the performance of "suspects."' 124 Un-
realistically low expectations may affect job assignments and performance. 
25
Because of statistical discrimination, the "suspect" workers may receive
lower evaluations than similarly-competent white coworkers. 126 In one ex-
periment, white subjects were asked to rank workers whose performance was
manipulated. They ranked African-American workers significantly lower
than white workers. 127 Statistical discrimination is not a discrete event oc-
curring at hiring. It pervades on-the-job interactions.
119. See Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech, 79 GEO. L.J. 399, 401-02 nn.6-7 (1991) (citing
examples of white students abusing minority students on university campuses).
120. Consider, for example, the results of a recent University of Cincinnati study of women in
the construction industry which found that even women who worked for companies with strong
antidiscrimination policies faced sexual harassment and sexist jokes. Women in Construction: Great
Opportunity, Great Frustration, United Press International, March 25, 1991 (available on Lexis).
121. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1647.
122. Id.
123. See Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 56, at 59 (citing studies suggesting majority workers
view token workers as incompetent and dissimilar).
124. See id. at 55-58 (experiments show that perceptions of "solo" individuals are more extreme
than perceptions of majority workers).
125. See id. at 55-56 (blacks sometimes internalize low expectations, leading to lower
performance).
126. See id. at 56, 60-65 (low expectations frequently result in low performance). See also
Hamner, Kim, Baird, & Bignoess, Race and Sex as Determinants of Ratings by Potential Employers
in a Simulated Work-Sampling Task, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 705 (1974) (empirical study in which
subjects exhibit race discrimination in ratings).
127. Hamner, Kim, Baird, & Bignoess, supra note 126, at 705.
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B. A FEDERAL FORUM
David Strauss suggests that if individual disparate treatment claims can no
longer be brought under Title VII, claimants will be able to sue only if their
claims can be brought as statutory or common law wrongful discharge
claims or in a grievance proceeding. 2 8 But eliminating individual claims
under Title VII will not have this effect because states have adopted antidis-
crimination laws which provide direct remedies for discrimination. The re-
sult of eliminating individual claims under Title VII will be to relegate them
to state fora, not eliminate them. The question, therefore, is whether a fed-
eral forum should be available.
A federal forum should be available because plaintiffs then have a better
chance of finding an unbiased forum: they can choose between state and fed-
eral court. State courts may often be more hospitable to these claims, but a
federal forum should be available for all the reasons federal courts have tra-
ditionally been available to redress discrimination claims in constitutional
and other areas: these are important cases and deserve the least biased forum
available. Pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, the federal government
should act affirmatively to provide more, not less, protection to vulnerable
groups than that available from the state.
C. THE INADEQUACY OF AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
Individual suits remain necessary because agency enforcement has always
been and is almost certain to remain inadequate. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has been notoriously ineffective at dealing
with individual complaints of discrimination. 2 9 Its primary priority during
the last decade has often been to close the maximum number of cases in as
timely a manner as possible. This is done most efficiently if claims are found
to have no reasonable basis after little or no investigation.
There is no reason to think that a new agency would do better. Strauss
proposes that discriminatory treatment claims be "screened in the way that
unfair labor practice claims are currently screened by the National Labor
Relations Board [NLRB]."' 30 But the NLRB has hardly been effective in
fostering strong unions in the United States. 13
128. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1655.
129. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity
Law Enforcement? 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1170 (1989) (Reagan era has left "the EEOC ...
largely inoperative"); Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back
Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1327 (1990) (during 1973-1975, the EEOC successfully liti-
gated or settled 1% of more than 12,800 charges).
130. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1655.
131. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1774-86 (1983) (NLRB's certification procedures, including a
lengthy representation campaign, make unionization more difficult).
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Effective administrative enforcement is hampered by bureaucracy, lack of
executive commitment, particularly in conservative administrations, and
budgetary limitations which are likely to be severe throughout the nineties.
Any one of these is sufficiently serious to make the Strauss proposal the
equivalent of abolishing disparate treatment remedies entirely.
In the absence of an individual cause of action, employers would be free to
treat minorities differently as long as employers hired them in sufficient num-
bers or paid the fines. For example, as long as Royal Tube employed African
Americans in sufficient numbers, it would be free to subject them to any
racial harassment or other forms of disparate treatment (such as different
work rules). If the Strauss proposal were to extend to sex discrimination-
and remedies for race and sex should not be separate' 32-then employers
would be free to require that female employees "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have [their] hair
styled, and wear jewelry."'' 33 As long as women were employed in sufficient
numbers, this treatment would be legal. As long as Royal Tube employed
the right number of African Americans and women, Gustafson would be free
to treat Helen Brooms any way he wanted.
In sum, the elimination of individual disparate treatment cases is not a
good idea for a variety of reasons ranging from the need to compensate indi-
vidual victims of discrimination to the EEOC's inefficiency and budgetary
pressure. Were individual claims eliminated, there would be no effective re-
dress of overt disparate treatment such as Helen Brooms experienced and
overt disparate treatment would probably increase dramatically. Further,
employment discrimination claims are not as weak as Strauss suggests. Were
the law substantively more hospitable to such claims and were they triable
before juries, there is no reason to think success rates would be significantly
lower than for other sorts of suits in federal courts. A federal forum should
remain available to increase the chances the plaintiff will find a nonbiased
forum.
V. QUOTAS AND FINES TIED TO NATIONAL POPULATION
The fine-quota system Strauss proposes would be unwise and unfair. It
would make the cost of doing business in rural Minnesota higher than the
cost of doing business in Washington, D.C., in effect transferring resources
from rural to urban areas. Under the proposal, rural Minnesota employers,
unable to meet their quota, would have to pay the fine, close, or move. In
132. For a discussion of why separate remedies for race and sex discrimination would be inap-
propriate, see supra text accompanying notes 77-89.
133. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, (1989) (holding such employer con-
duct discriminatory).
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contrast, urban employers surrounded by large minority populations would
only have to hire minorities in proportion to their presence in the national
employment pool. For example, regardless of the percentage of African
Americans in the labor pool for Washington D.C., a Washington D.C. em-
ployer would only have to hire twelve percent or so, the proportion of Afri-
can Americans in the national population. Many urban employers would be
able to set overt quotas and hire fewer minorities then they would hire if they
did not discriminate, and nondiscriminatory rural employers would have to
pay fines.
Similarly, the Strauss proposal would give employers of low skilled labor
the right to hire fewer minorities than are available and would fine employers
of highly skilled labor for their likely inability to find skilled minorities in
national-population numbers. Both an engineering firm and a trucking firm
would have to hire twelve percent African Americans or pay fines. The engi-
neering firm will almost certainly pay the fines and the trucking firm might
well employ only twelve percent African-American truckers. Again, em-
ployers will be able to set overt quotas and hire fewer minorities then they
would hire if they did not discriminate. In response to these criticisms, Pro-
fessor Strauss has modified his original proposal by providing that there
would be a reward for employers who exceed - the national population
quota. 134 But unless this "reward" is set at the appropriately high level, an
exceedingly unlikely event in the current political climate, minorities will be
underemployed in the geographic areas in which they are concentrated and
in the jobs for which they are most qualified.
Both problems discussed thus far in this section could be eliminated were
the quotas tied to the minority's presence in the qualified workforce in the
local geographic area. 1 35 Such quotas would be a good remedy against future
discrimination. But a serious problem remains besides the lack of compensa-
tion for victims of discriminatory wrongs.
Strauss's system of quotas would be politically feasible only if the fines
were set so low that they would be equivalent to a "license to discriminate."
Strauss's proposal bears an uncanny resemblance to Professor Derrick Bell's
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1996 (as related by Geneva Crenshaw), which
gives employers a license to discriminate on the basis of race provided they
pay a fee into an "equality fund" used to improve the social and economic
status of African Americans. 136 Bell's proposal is, however, premised on the
134. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1655 n.69 and accompanying text.
135. Strauss resists this solution because employers would then have an incentive to move to
areas in which there are few minorities. Id. at 1656. There is, however, no perfect solution.
136. See Bell, Foreword, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1991) (suggesting a licensing and fee system as a
radical but workable method of ending black subordination).
1686 [Vol. 79:1659
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. L.J. 1686 1990-1991
NEEDED IN THE NINETIES
view that Americans do not want effective remedies whereas Strauss's is pre-
mised on the view that Title VII has been so effective it is no longer needed.
I fear that Geneva Crenshaw is right. With respect to future action, quo-
tas are the most effective remedy. But even legislation that does not explic-
itly mandate quotas-such as the Civil Rights Act of 1990,137 vetoed by
Bush-is damned by being labeled a "quota bill." 138 As this issue goes to
press, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,139 which explicitly bans quotas, is being
successfully characterized by opponents as a quota bill.'4 ° Imagine what
would happen to a bill which really does mandate quotas! The only version
of Strauss's proposal that the American political system could produce
would be a license to discriminate.
There is an additional danger in Strauss's proposal. His criticisms of cur-
rent individual remedies would be politically acceptable. The result could be
the repeal of Title VII and section 1983 without the adoption of quotas. Re-
formers interested in improving remedies for employment discrimination
should concentrate on less dangerous changes rather than hopelessly advo-
cating quotas in the current climate. In addition, they should consider
changes beyond the workplace that are likely to facilitate equality in the
workplace.
VI. STRENGTHENING TITLE VII AND SYSTEMIC REMEDIES
Although Title VII has improved the situation somewhat for minorities
and women, 14' Title VII is not a very effective remedy. David Strauss has
pointed out a number of the problems, as I have elsewhere.1
42 Individual
cases alleging disparate treatment on the basis of sex or race are hard to win
without smoking gun evidence. 143 In part, this is because judges are rela-
tively hostile to such claims and have developed substantive rules favoring
defendants.
137. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
138. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, 101st. Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1990) (explicitly stating bill
does not require or encourage quotas); Raspberry, Sign the Civil Rights Bill, Wash. Post, Oct. 22,
1990, at A 1l, col. I (Bush Administration claims bill is a "quota" bill even though many amend-
ments adopted to ensure bill does not have that effect).
139. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
140. See Major Differences Over Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1991, at A14, col. 1. My point
holds regardless of whether the 1990 or 1991 Civil Rights Acts would require or permit quotas;
even reform which does not explicitly mandate quotas can be killed with the quota label. Reformers
should not expect to be able to camouflage legislation mandating quotas as something else.
141. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
142. See Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional
Remedies. A Reply to Fischel & Lazear, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 934 passim (1986) (Title VII, for
example, does not effectively remedy undervaluing a "women's job," customer discrimination, or
subtle steering of women into traditional jobs). See also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
143. Becker, supra note 142, at 939.
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A. IMPROVEMENTS TO TITLE VII
Many of these problems could and should be addressed by improving Title
VII, as the civil rights community has been trying to do with the vetoed Civil
Rights Act of 1990 and proposed Act of 1991. I mention a number of im-
provements to Title VII here, most of which were part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 and are included in the proposed Act of 1991.'"
Because part of the problem is judges' reluctance to rule for plaintiffs, jury
trials should be available in all employment discrimination cases, including
disparate impact as well as disparate treatment. 145 Full compensatory dam-
ages should be available in disparate treatment cases so that, for example,
Helen Brooms is able to recover for the injury she sustained in falling down
the stairs. 46 This wrong should be compensated for the same compensatory
justice reasons other personal injuries are compensated. Filing requirements
should be made more liberal. If an employee shows that sex or race tainted
an employment decision, the employee should win and the employer should
not have the opportunity to show that the same decision would have been
made anyway. Title VII should award the successful plaintiff damages plus
experts' fees, costs, and attorneys' fees. 147 Damages should include full com-
pensatory damages and, when appropriate (e.g., in Helen Brooms's case) pu-
nitive damages.
A more effective remedy for job segregation should be devised.148 Judges
144. For other discussions of ways to improve enforcement see e.g., Clark, The Future Civil
Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. UNIV. L. RE.
795, 815-26 (1989) (suggestions include liberalizing the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, forcing
employers to disclose information on their employment patterns, and authorizing the EEOC to hold
hearings and issue cease and desist orders); Rose, supra note 129, at 1169-81 (calling for increasing
executive enforcement of equal employment laws, awarding plaintiffs' experts' fees, analyzing stan-
dardized tests, and establishing a Cabinet level council to coordinate enforcement of antidiscrimina-
tion laws).
145. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would only have extended the right to jury trial to disparate
treatment claims for compensatory damages (i.e., monetary damages beyond back pay). See S.
2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a) (1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides a jury trial only
when a claim of intentional discrimination is made. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(B) (1991).
146. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d at 417.
147. Such costs are not always available in Title VII cases. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989) (Title VII does not permit award of nominal
damages or attorney's fees when plaintiff suffered harassment, but such harassment did not cause
her discharge). For a discussion of the general need to award plaintiffs' experts' fees, see Rose,
supra note 129, at 1174-1175.
148. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 did not include any provision addressing sex segregation, nor
is one included in the proposed Act of 1991. Strauss apparently regards "choice" as an adequate
explanation for job segregation. He is not troubled by any part of the earnings gap being attributa-
ble to members of different groups holding different jobs because they might have "exogenous rea-
sons" for doing so. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1623-24. But the supply of labor is not "exogenous" to
employment opportunities. If a group has been excluded from an occupation, it is not likely to be in
the relevant labor pool. Workers' occupational interests are not established for life at the time they
enter the wage-labor market. Instead, these interests change over time as a result of employment
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should rule for plaintiffs in sex or race segregation cases unless the employer
shows that it made significant efforts to attract women or racial minorities,
efforts which would have been effective had women or racial minorities been
interested. 149 An employer in such a case should prevail only on a showing
that they have enlisted "the participation of community organizations that
serve working women [and minority communities] and employ creative strat-
egies to describe the work in terms that will appeal to women" and
minorities. ' 50
Title VII should be amended to require explicitly that all jobs as rabbis,
ministers, and priests be open to women. This change is needed both to open
these powerful employment opportunities to women and to moderate the
sexism in mainstream religion.
5 1
Disparate impact should also be strengthened. An employer should be
held to the standard originally applicable in disparate treatment cases. Em-
ployers would then lose disparate impact cases unless they could show that
there were not enough qualified minorities in the available labor pool or that
the practice was significantly related to productivity.
At a minimum, the federal government, the states, and very large employ-
ers (who tend to set internal wages according to internal evaluations) should
be required to make internal comparable worth evaluations followed by in-
ternal adjustments. 15 2 This limited comparable worth remedy would create a
climate in which comparable worth arguments could more easily be made
within employment structures by all employees and would probably result in
some improvement without requiring the courts to use standards that seem,
at the present time, exceedingly vague. At some point, a better-developed
comparable worth standard should be imposed on all employers.
Finally, Title VII should be amended to include agency enforcement
through the use of testers; that is, the agency should send employers similar
applicants of varying sex and race. Remedies for finding tester discrimina-
tion should include fines and whatever other remedies the judge considers
experiences. See Schultz, supra note 103, at 1815-39 (discussing how women's work preferences are
created and shaped by employment conditions).
149. See Schultz, supra note 103, at 1841-42 (employers should be required to make efforts to
change their workplaces so that women will be attracted to nontraditional jobs).
150. Id. at 1842. In addition, employers should guard against "hiring criteria, training pro-
grams, performance evaluation standards, mobility and reward structures, response to harassment,
and its managers' and male workers' day-to-day attitudes and actions" which create "an organiza-
tional culture" that "debilitates women from aspiring to nontraditional jobs." Id.
151. For a more general discussion of the problems women face as result of patriarchal religion,
see Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
152. Employees would initially be able to sue only to force the internal evaluation and adjust-
ment, but not to challenge the terms of either.
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appropriate. 15 3
B. STRUCTURAL INEQUITIES CONNECTED TO EMPLOYMENT
Although individual employment discrimination remedies are appropriate,
they will always be inadequate for two reasons. First, many discriminatees
will not sue. Second, and more fundamentally, remedies focusing on employ-
ment cannot address the many and varied structural inequities contributing
to racial and sexual inequality in employment. The next Civil Rights Act
(after some form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is passed) should be a broad
attack on structural inequalities affecting employment. I will call it the Civil
Rights Act of 2001.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 2001
Education should be one of the four major components of this bill. Educa-
tion creates a number of serious structural barriers to employment success
for African Americans. Schools in African American communities tend to
be underfunded and of low quality relative to schools in other communities.
People "educated" at such schools are often disadvantaged for life because
they have not had the opportunity to develop basic skills needed for success-
ful employment.
In addition, when African Americans and other Americans are educated
in segregated schools-which means housed in separate neighborhoods-
they are likely to lead segregated lives-which means that African Ameri-
cans will tend to be impoverished. In part this is because of differential op-
portunities, but in part it is because separation throughout childhood
contributes to the development of racist attitudes in whites. It is easier to
think of a minority group as different, and possibly inferior, if one has had
little contact with them. 154 As other researchers more knowledgeable about
education than I have noted, "isolation of blacks has perpetuated patterns of
avoidance learning and social behavior among whites that cause them to re-
sist desegregation in the schools and in other social settings."' 55
153. Such judicially ordered remedies should include quotas or goals, but the bill would not refer
to such remedies for the political reasons already discussed. See supra notes 136-138 and accompa-
nying text.
Enforcers other than EEOC have begun to use testers. See, e.g., Urban Institute Research Using
Testers Documents Bias Against Black Job Seekers, Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 94 at A-4 (May
15, 1991) (Urban Institute used testers to find discrimination by employers in Chicago and Wash-
ington, D.C.); Washington Civil Rights Group Uses Testers as Basis for Bias Suit Against Personnel
Agency, Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 86 at A-3 (May 3, 1991) (Fair Employment Council of
Greater Washington used testers to find discrimination by personnel agency).
154. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
155. Braddock, Crain, & McPartland, A Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent
Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259, 261 (1984). See also E. ARONSON,
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Not surprisingly, an employer survey reveals that employers are more
likely to hire African Americans from desegregated schools.' 5 6 Both blacks
and whites who have attended integrated schools are more likely to work in a
desegregated workplace. 57 Researchers have found that "attending desegre-
gated schools improves the attitudes of both blacks and whites toward future
interracial situations."15  African Americans who attend integrated schools
are more likely to be in integrated jobs and earn more money than African
Americans who have gone to segregated schools.' 59
This Civil Rights Act would ban the use of local property taxes to fund
public education and would require collection of taxes on a state-wide basis
and payment on a per pupil basis. In addition, the bill would contain a
voucher system for every child in a private school. Given the desperate
plight of many minority children in terrible public schools, this radical step is
necessary to give these children a better chance at gaining an education. 
60
The second major component of this bill would be housing. The housing
program would be designed to integrate suburban and other areas. Empiri-
cal research shows that desegregated education and housing are likely to oc-
cur together. 16 1 This aspect of the law would have a number of features,
including middle class and subsidized desegregated housing projects in all-
white areas.
A third component would provide funding for nontraditional job training
for minorities and women and for involvement of community-based organi-
zations in placing the graduates of these programs. 162 This component
would include provisions designed to ensure that high schools and welfare-
THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 268-271 (1988) (the expectation that integration is inevitable decreases preju-
dice among groups).
156. See Braddock & McPartland, How Minorities Continue to be Excluded from Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 5 (1987)
(social contacts strongly affect likelihood of hiring).
157. Braddock, Crain, & McPartland, supra note 155, at 262.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 263-64.
160. Under this system, some children may end up in schools even worse than inner city public
schools are today. Were the situation today less grim, I would not make such a proposal.
161. Braddock, Crain, & McPartland, supra note 155, at 262.
162. See, e.g., Haignere & Steinberg, Nontraditional Training for Women: Effective Programs,
Structural Barriers, and Political Hurdles, in JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN: THE PROMISE AND
LIMIrs OF PUBLIC POLICIES 352-55 (1989) (discussing promising programs for nontraditional
training for women under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act); Law, "Girls Can't
Be Plumbers"--Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45 passim (1989) (describing barriers faced by women in the construction indus-
try and advocating increased enforcement of antidiscrimination laws plus community programs to
open opportunities up for women). See also Braddock & McPartland, supra note 156, at 26 (minor-
ities more likely to be hired "when employers use community agencies to recruit applicants, even
after the race composition of the local labor market and other job characteristics are taken into
account").
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related work training programs do not steer people only into types of em-
ployment deemed appropriate for their sex or race. 63 Such steering is cur-
rently widespread despite antidiscrimination mandates.164 In addition,
welfare-to-work programs would focus on training people for good jobs,
rather than for the lowest possible employment opportunity.
The fourth and final component of the Civil Rights Act of 2001 would
focus on socialization. Federal funds would be used to develop courses at all
educational levels addressing the problems of racism and sexism. Such
courses would include critical analysis of media presentations of racial mi-
norities and women and would be a prerequisite to continued federal fund-
ing. In addition, other more direct approaches to controlling media racism
and sexism would be explored by a governmental commission.
Many of my proposals are politically difficult. None, however, would be
as dangerous as an offer to replace individual remedies with quotas in the
current political climate. It is all too likely that such a proposal would be
partially accepted: individual remedies would be repealed but quotas would
not be enacted. Further, as noted earlier, the Strauss quota system could be
enacted only if the fines were set so low that it would operate as a license to
discriminate.' 65 Advocating such a proposal is dangerous in ways in which
my suggestions, I hope, are not.
CONCLUSION
Economic models of discrimination are both too thin and too limited to be
accepted by the reformer as describing the world of discrimination. Eco-
nomic models are too thin in a number of fatal ways. They assume,
counterfactually, that people act rationally and that sexism and racism are
susceptible to rational calculation and correction. They assume what needs
to be understood: how racism and sexism develop and persist. They do not
even purport to describe the desire to subordinate and difficulty with empa-
thy, two common forms of discrimination.
Professor Strauss discusses the conventional justifications for remedies for
race discrimination without mentioning history or any racial minority other
than African Americans, nor noticing that most people of color are women.
Since Hispanic and African-American women are the most disadvantaged
group in employment (based on wages), it is necessary to consider how race
163. See De Parle, Skills-Training Policy Opening Doors to Jobs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at
A16, col. 1 (describing unusual welfare-to-work programs which train women in nontraditional and
better paying jobs).
164. See Rhode, supra note 73, at 199-200 (government funded education perpetuates stereotypes
in part by failing "to improve women's math and science skills" or "to interest men in traditionally
female vocations").
165. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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and sex discrimination intersect. Remedies must be tailored to the needs of
these most vulnerable groups; separate race and sex remedies are not
adequate.
There are a number of problems with the Strauss proposal. Under it, em-
ployers would have too little incentive to employ minorities in those geo-
graphic areas in which they are concentrated and for those jobs for which
they are most likely to be qualified. There are many reasons why individual
claims should still be allowed; indeed, such remedies should be strengthened.
More fundamentally, the proposal to replace current individual remedies
with quotas is extremely dangerous. The likely result in the racist political
climate of the United States today would be partial success: elimination of
individual remedies and either no quotas or a system of fines so low that they
would be a "license to discriminate."
A less dangerous reform package would attempt to strengthen Title VII
and enact structural remedies. Title VII, as it is currently constituted, has
become too weak a remedy for employment discrimination. It has always
been too narrowly focused on employment to be effective in eliminating the
structural barriers to equal employment opportunities for all women and
men. Title VII should be strengthened by including, in part, a better remedy
for job segregation and a ban on sex requirements for religious ministry. In
addition, a number of structural remedies are necessary, such as improved
educational opportunities and greater school desegregation.
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